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LANGUAGE ACQUISITION AS A COMPUTATIONAL PROBLEM
What makes language learning appear so easy for children? This question is at the
centre of one of the most lively debates in modern linguistics and psychology (Gold,
1967; Pinker, 1989; Seidenberg, 1997; Wexler & Culicover, 1980). Interestingly,
computers have had a pervasive influence on the way we understand the process
of language acquisition and on the question of language learnability in particular. By
asking what children can learn from the input they are exposed to, linguists have
implicitly framed the problem of language acquisition as a machine learning question.
Machine learning theory formalizes learning problems in the following manner:
* There is a learner whose objective is to discover/model a mapping from a
space A to a space B:
* Learning happens as examples of pairing of points x 2 A7!y 2 B are provided
to the learner by the environment.
*Correspondence to: Frederic Kaplan, Ecole Polytechnique Fe´de´rale de Lausanne, EPFL-
CRAFT, Lausanne, Switzerland. E-mail-frederic.kaplan@epfl.ch
Copyright # 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
In machine learning terms, a language learner is confronted with two types of
task. The first is to learn the structure of the language they are exposed to: the
mapping they have to learn is from the space of sentences S to the binary space
coding for syntactic correctness/incorrectness B ¼ fcorrect;notcorrectg: The
second task is to learn to assign semantic content to these sentences: the
mapping is from S to the space of meanings M or vice versa.
Framing language acquisition in these formal terms has allowed researchers to
pursue mathematical and computational studies of language learning. These
studies have played a central role in the controversies about language learnability
and have been used by different explanatory frameworks, often to support
contradictory views. More than this, although, computational models have from
the beginning defined the terms of the debate. In each successive model, the
computational problems of language acquisition described above have been
progressively reframed in novel ways. This article discusses the role of these
models in different ‘stances’ towards language acquisition, from generative
views to more recently introduced approaches focusing on embodiment,
cognitive development and cultural evolution. After offering a brief overview
of these different approaches, the article enters into the details of several specific
computational models in order to articulate in a precise manner the role they play
in the debate.
STANCES
The Generative Stance
The generative stance has dominated modern linguistics during the second half
of the 20th century. In this view, the central problem of language acquisition is the
learning of syntax. Syntax provides the basis for distinguishing well-formed from
ill-formed sentences and permits the creation of an in principle infinite set of
well-formed utterance. Thus, most of the modelling effort of the generative
stance has concerned the first learning problem that we mentioned: learning a
mapping between the space of sentence S to the binary space code for syntactic
correctness/incorrectness (Gold, 1967; Wexler & Culicover, 1980). This has led to
the Poverty of Stimulus hypothesis, which claims that the input available to
children underdetermines what they learn about language (Chomsky, 1975, 1980;
Marcus, 1999), especially because children do not receive explicit feedbacks as
they learn. In formal terms, this means that models of the syntactic input that
infants receive, used as training examples to general syntactic learning systems,
could not account for the precise and fast learning that human infants display
given. Researchers then proposed that this could only be solved by adding some
human-language-specific biases to the learning systems. Likewise, subsequent
arguments were developed that state that language learning, including semantic
mapping, is not possible without a substantial genetic preprogramming of
specific neural circuits (Gallistel, 2000; Pinker & Bloom, 1990). Jumping to the
conclusion that language is simply not learnable by general means, many authors
have tended to reduce the role of learning in language development to a very
small contribution (Piattelli-Palmarini, 1989), like the setting of a few parameters
as in the Principles and Parameters theory (Chomsky & Halle, 1968) or as
ordering of innate constraints, as in Optimality Theory (Archangeli &
Langendoen, 1997). However, for a decade or so, the Poverty of Stimulus
hypothesis has been empirically challenged by other approaches.
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The Statistical Stance
The Poverty of Stimulus hypothesis was first challenged by a number of
computational experiments showing how rather general statistical induction
machine learning techniques could in practice extract linguistic patterns in the
flow of sounds, words and sentences (e.g. Elman, 1990; Seidenberg, 1997; Solan,
Horn, Ruppin, & Edelman, 2005): ‘Rather than involving hypothesis testing about
grammatical rules, learning involves accumulating information about statistical
and probabilistic aspect of language’ (Seidenberg & MacDonald, 1999). Compared
with the generative approach that focuses on the so-called competence aspect of the
linguistic faculty, the statistical learning stance stresses the importance of
performance}actual production and comprehension of utterances. On this view,
the use of language and not grammaticality judgments is the core of linguistic
knowledge. A recent review (Elman, 2005) argues convincingly that in the field of
language development, such computational models have clearly shown that there
is often much more information in the linguistic input that children encounter than
previously thought. This structure can be captured by state-of-the-art general
machine learning algorithms. In other words, the ‘Stimulus’ is richer than expected.
Likewise, learning a mapping between two streams of data}learning to pair
linguistic form with meaning}has been addressed as a problem of evaluation of
statistical occurrences based on cross-situational inference (e.g. Siskind, 1996). The
so-called probabilistic constraint approach (Seidenberg & MacDonald, 1999) has
made strides in showing that adults store vast amounts of statistical information, in
particular distributional information, about the behaviour of lexical items in their
language. In English, for instance, verbs seem to provide strong constraints that are
used for resolving syntactic ambiguities. Yet, some authors argued that despite
these successes, this machine learning perspective fails to capture several
important characteristics of human language learning (e.g. Marcus, 1998), and
others have argued that framing the debate on language learnability in statistical
terms ignores other critical components of learning (see below).
The Embodied and Social Cognition Stance
Most computational approaches to language acquisition do not take into account,
at least in their models, the embodied and social dimension of this process. Yet,
the fact that language and concepts are acquired through the use of a physical
body and the fact that language is an interactive process taking place between
individuals situated in social and physical environments could not help but
constrain language learning. This is particularly important for the second
problem we mentioned concerning language acquisition: associating semantic
content with sentences. Naturally, expanding the scope of investigation beyond
isolated and idealized linguistic knowledge significantly complicates the nature
of models and the explanations they offer. However, at the same time, and more
interestingly, the body, physical and social context, and goals of the learning
agent can serve as a set of biases, which dramatically affect what a learner can
and will learn. To investigate this view, researchers have for instance endowed
artificial agents with a virtual incarnation of the human biological system
underlying spatial relations (for spatial preposition learning) or physical action
(for action verb learning), or whatever the relevant semantic domain is (e.g.
Bailey, 1997; Regier, 1996). Similar experiments have also been conducted with
physical robots (Cangelosi, Smith, & Smith, 2006; Dominey, 2005; Roy &
Pentland, 2002; Steels & Kaplan, 2000; Sugita & Tani, 2005). In such approaches,
Computational Models in the Debate 57
Copyright # 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Inf. Child Dev. 17: 55–80 (2008)
DOI: 10.1002/icd
the meaning of a word is a schematic (that is, abstracted) representation of
concrete perceptual, motor and other experiences. Broadly, when a computa-
tional learner already includes a model of the human motor system, this makes
the learning of verbs of motion, like push or appuyer, much easier, since it
constrains the space of possible meanings. Likewise, in the domain of spatial
relations terms, the system endowed with human-like visual capacities need only
to figure out where to make categorical distinctions in the semantic domain, and
learn how to pair these conceptualizations with the phonology of the words
denoting these categories. The key point of such models stress is that taking into
consideration the embodiment and social environment of learners radically
improves accounts of language learning because the inherent biases they
introduce facilitate processes that would in principle be exponentially harder
than anything learning machines could do.
The Developmental Stance
The three previous stances are subject to the critique that they only consider specific
linguistic problems in isolation, and ignore the developmental processes that
surround and support the acquisition of language. In these frameworks, language
development is most often considered in terms of sequence of competencies
without much explanation of how the child gets from one to another.
Developmental models try to fill this gap, by investigating how a computational
learner can learn in an incremental and open-ended manner (see Lungarella, Metta,
Pfeifer, & Sandini, 2003; Oudeyer, Kaplan, & Hafner, 2007; Prince, Helder, &
Hollich, 2005; Weng et al., 2001, as well as Berthouze & Kaplan, 2005; Berthouze &
Metta, 2004; Kaplan & Oudeyer, 2006 for current trends in this emerging field).
Similarly, computational approaches to language acquisition belonging to the
previous stances generally consider the problem of learning the structure present in
an input stream as a passive process: learners are ‘exposed to’/given learning
examples. On the contrary, developmental accounts argue that human infants
actively explore their environment, in particular the linguistic environment, and
thereby influence the linguistic input that they can potentially observe (Berlyne,
1960; Smith & Gasser, 2005; White, 1959). By doing so, they can control the
complexity of their learning experiences to ensure the input feeds into the learner’s
current developmental state, instead of having to cope directly with the full-fledged
complexity of the language. This new line of models, although still in its infancy,
offers a constructive novel perspective on the language learnability question.
The Cultural Evolution Stance
The four previously outlined stances towards human language learning do not
take into account language evolution. The generative stance argues that since
only specially tuned or biased learning machines can acquire the syntax of
human languages, humans must also have such language-specific biases in order
to successfully acquire language. The cultural evolution approach turns this
argumentation on its head, and proposes instead that languages have evolved
culturally so as to become easily learnable by individuals with pre-existing non-
language-specific cognitive capabilities. This line of thinking is explored by yet
another kind of computational models that involve language creation and
evolution in populations of individuals (Brighton, Kirby, & Smith, 2005; Kirby,
2001; Oudeyer, 2005a; Zuidema, 2003).
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The computational models used by these five stances are rather diverse. They
share neither exactly the same assumptions nor the same types of implementation
and more importantly they do not address the same issues in the language
learnability controversy. Table 1 presents a broad summary of these differences. In
the following sections, we will discuss five computational models, one belonging
to each of these stances. This will more clearly illustrate how they are used in the
debate. Inevitably, the choice of any particular models as representative of a given
stance will have drawbacks. Nevertheless, we believe that characterizing specific
models in greater detail will help elucidate the similarities and the differences
among these various approaches and, more importantly, the role that computa-
tional models play in the debate over language learnability.
GENERATIVE STANCE: A THEORETICAL MODEL
In 1967, Gold wrote a theoretical article discussing the question: ‘For which classes
of language does a learning algorithm exist?’ (Gold, 1967, p. 448). To our
knowledge, this model is the first known attempt to capture the notion of
learnability. In this article, Gold explicitly casts the problem of language
learnability as a machine learning problem. He defines a language as a set of
Table 1. Stances
Stance Focus Key points
Generative Grammaticality, classes of
grammar
Theoretical models show that certain classes
of languages are not learnable without
feedbacks. Therefore, innate learning circuits
specific to language are necessary to com-
pensate for ‘the poverty of the stimulus’
Statistical
learning
Statistical structures of existing
language and general learning
methods to induce them
Semantics and grammatical functions can be
extracted from distributional information
presented in child-directed speech. The
‘Stimulus’ is richer than expected. This
information can be derived from noisy data
using, for instance, connectionist networks,
without explicit feedback
Embodied and
social cognition
Role of physical and social
constraints
Robotic and computational models illustrate
how embodied and social constraints radi-
cally transform the problem of learning
language. These models support the idea
that it is the common substrate of the human
motor control and perceptual systems that
drive children’s rapid and flexible acquisi-
tion of verbs and nouns
Developmental Developmental processes,
active learning, motivation
Robotic and computational models illustrate
how computational learners can actively
control the complexity of their learning
experiences and follow a developmental
path instead of having to cope immediately
with the full-fledged complexity of language
Cultural evolu-
tion
Adaptation of language to
human cognition
Models involving populations of interacting
learners explore the hypothesis that lan-
guages have evolved culturally so as to
become easily learnable by individuals with
preexisting non-language specific cognitive
capabilities
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strings over some finite alphabet. A class of languages will be considered learnable
if there is an algorithm capable of identifying it ‘in the limit’. This means that after
some finite time, the algorithm will systematically guess properly which language
it is (i.e. a finite number of incorrect guesses are allowed).
From his investigation, Gold concludes that the class of context-sensitive
language is learnable (in the sense previously defined) if the learner is informed
which strings are in the language and which strings are not. Without this
information not even the class of regular languages is learnable. However, Gold
remains cautious about the conclusions that can be drawn from such a theoretical
analysis. If it is true that most children are rarely informed when they make
grammatical errors (which means that they learn syntax solely from positive
utterances), and if one accepts the formal notions he introduced as a model of
learnability, then his studies must lead to one of the following conclusions.
1. ‘The class of possible natural languages is much smaller than one would
expect from our present model of syntax’ (p. 453). This can mean, for ins-
tance, that even if English is context sensitive, it is not true that just any
context-sensitive language can occur naturally. Likewise, it can imply (and this
is the conclusion that most people retain from this study) that the child starts
out with constraining information about the language she will have to learn.
2. ‘The child receives negative instances by being corrected in a way we do not
recognize’ (p. 453). If indeed the child is being presented information of such a
kind, then the class of primitive recursive languages, which includes context-
sensitive language, becomes learnable. Negative evidence may for instance
occur when the child does not get the desired response to an utterance. Gold
admits that ‘it is difficult to interpret the actual training program of a child in
terms of the naive model of language assumed here’.
3. ‘The child may learn that a certain string is not acceptable by the fact the it
never occurs in a certain context’ (p. 454). This would be the equivalent of a
negative instance.
The Model in the Debate
Several empirical studies with young infants have argued that children show
sensitivity to structures for which there is no evidence in the input and sensitivity
to grammatical constraints at the youngest ages at which they can be tested
(Crain, 1991). There is not sufficient space in this article to review all the kinds of
argument that have been taken as evidence for the innateness of grammar.
However, Gold’s analysis of learnability is a representative example of the kind
of formal models that have been used to defend the Poverty of Stimulus
hypothesis (Chomsky, 1975, 1980; Marcus, 1999). Interestingly, for Gold himself,
this possible interpretation of the model is only one of the several.
STATISTICAL LEARNING STANCE: A CONNECTIONIST MODEL
‘Claims about what cannot be learned by the child need to be assessed in terms of
the kinds of statistical information available to the child and learning mechanism
that are able to extract non-obvious regularities from it’ (Seidenberg &
MacDonald, 1999, p. 10). This assertion from Seidenberg and MacDonald’s
comprehensive review of the domain stresses the perspective shift introduced by
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the statistical learning stance. In the past 15 years, a number of empirical (non-
computational) studies have demonstrated that distributional information that
could be used to induce semantic and grammatical categories does in fact exist in
child-directed speech, and that learners are sensitive to it (Brent & Cartwright,
1996; Mintz, Newport, & Bever, 2002; Redington, Chater, & Finch, 1998; Saffran,
2001). Computational modelling has crucially turned these observations into an
actual formal framework that addresses language learnabiliy.
Elman’s simple recurrent networks (Figure 1) have played a major role in this
debate (Elman, 1990, 2004, 2005; Elman et al., 2001). Layers in these networks are
composed of one or more units. Information flows from input units to the hidden
units and then to the output units. In addition, at every time step t; units from the
hidden layer receive input from the so-called context layer, which simply stores
the activation of the hidden (intermediary) units from time t" 1: The crucial part
of the network is the recurrence from the activation of the hidden units to the
context layer. This amounts to incorporating some memory into the neural
network, and even though only the last internal state is stored, the memory
capacity is potentially much deeper.
For instance, in one set of simulations, a network was trained to predict
upcoming words, given a corpus of sentences that had been generated by an
artificial, natural-like, grammar (Elman, 1990). The network was presented one
word at a time and had to predict the next word based on the input layer and the
context units. No other information was available for learning. The success or
failure of prediction could be verified when the next item was processed. This
network, in which learning and testing phases are part of a single process, learned
to predict in a context-appropriate manner all the words that were grammatically
possible. Moreover, a closer look at the hidden unit vector showed that it performed
a hierarchical categorization of the words present in that language. Figure 2 plots
three (of the 70 actual) dimensions of the network’s ‘mental space’. The state space
is partitioned into different regions that correspond to both grammatical and
semantic categories. Hierarchical relationship between categories (dog within non-
human animal within animal within nouns) is shown by nesting relationship in
space. Thus, the network has learned relevant grammatical and semantic properties
of each word and uses these to generate expectations about successive words in the
sentences. Finally, in such experiments, the rate of acquiring new words is initially
slow because no category structure has yet emerged. However, once a critical mass
is achieved, the acquisition rate accelerates. Elman (2004) has argued that this effect
could be related to the vocabulary burst (4–9 words a day (Smith & Gasser, 2005))
often documented for children around 18 months.
Input units
Hidden units
Output units
Context units
Figure 1. Elman’s simple recurrent network (adapted from Elman, 2004).
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The Model in the Debate
Compared with the generative stance, models like this one explore a radically
different approach, shifting from symbolic to non-symbolic models of learning,
from innate grammatical rules to emergent grammatical structure, from
discontinuity between acquisition and processing to continuity between the two
processes. It could be argued that the core issue addressed by the generative
stance, learning a complex grammar, is not yet really addressed convincingly by
the statistical and connectionist approaches (see, for instance, Marcus, 1998).
Researchers like Elman argue that the learning potential of recurrent networks has
not yet been fully explored and that simulations involving complex sentences have
already shown that recurrent networks can learn agreement relations that span
multiple embeddings and long distance filler-gap dependencies (e.g. Christiansen
& Chater, 1999). What is important for us is that simple recurrent networks not
only illustrate a statistical view of language acquisition but also significantly
restructure the debate on language learnability in concrete terms}connectionist
approaches can tangibly be shown to have or not have certain learning capacities.
EMBODIED AND SOCIAL STANCE: A COMPUTATIONAL MODEL OF
ACTION VERB LEARNING
Humans learning language are unlike most artificial learning machines in that they
are situated in a real-world environment, embodied in an immensely complex
Figure 2. Schematic visualization in 3D of the high-dimensional state space described in
the hidden unit layer of Elman’s simple recurrent network (reprinted from Elman, 2004).
This figure is available in colour online at www.interscience.wiley.com/journal/icd
F. Kaplan et al.62
Copyright # 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Inf. Child Dev. 17: 55–80 (2008)
DOI: 10.1002/icd
physical organism, and learn language as part of their development of means to
achieve social and material goals. All cognitively normal children acquire words
beginning around 12 months of age and will acquire on average 10 words per day
until adulthood, often on the basis of single or indirect exposure, and mostly
without explicit instruction (Bloom, 2000). They begin with words whose meanings
are directly grounded in their situated, embodied experiences. Children’s first
words (Bloom, 1993) consist of words denoting concrete objects (ball, bottle, juice,
mommy, baby, horse, etc.), words cuing social interactions (yes, no more, up, bye-bye,
uh-oh, etc.), words denoting concrete events and actions (go, get, sit, etc.), words
denoting concrete sounds (woof, moo, choo-choo, etc.), and concrete prepositions and
demonstratives (out, that, here, etc.). Importantly, languages cut up the world in
different ways, so that a particular form-meaning pairing in one language such as
English push or onmight be split into different words in another language, such as
French appuyer ‘push [a button]’ and pousser ‘push [an object]’ or German auf ‘on [a
horizontal surface]’ and an ‘on [a vertical surface]’. This means that language
learners must have the ability to construct categories on the basis of linguistic
input}they cannot be pre-wired (as, for instance, suggested by Nelson (1973)).
How can a computational approach tackle the effects of embodiment in
language acquisition? Bailey’s (1997) model of action verb learning is a
representative example. The specific task addressed by the model is the
following: ‘Given a set of pairings of actions and verbs, learn the bidirectional
mapping between the two so that future actions can be labelled and future
commands can be acted out’ (p. 2). Thus, the model includes an active motor
control mechanism (and not just passive description of actions) based on the
so-called x-schemas represented using the Petri net formalism (Figure 3). An
x-schema for sliding an object on a tabletop may for instance represent that the
sequence initially begins by either grasping the object or placing the palm against
it and then proceeds to move in a given direction with a given force. Each schema
is then summarized as a collection of features (posture, direction, force, etc.). The
system is then presented with pairs of actions and labels in the form of verbs that
could be used to describe those actions in a language to be learned. Learning to
use these verbs thus consists in learning which parameters of the motor actions
are relevant to the use of which verb labels. In some cases, the system can
discover that particular verbs, like push, are best modelled as corresponding to
two distinctive senses: push may correspond not only (1) to sliding actions which
usually use the palm (or in suitable contexts might use the index finger) and
which tend to be directed away from the body or downward but also (2) to
actions such as pushing on a flat surface in which there is no motion but instead a
steady application of significant force, almost always involving a palm posture.
When tested on English, the system achieves about 80% accuracy for both
labelling actions and executing actions when given a label, and its success rates
on other languages that partition the same semantic space in radically different
ways, like Russian and Farsi, are nearly as promising.
The Model in the Debate
Bailey’s model and others investigating similar approaches introduce a novel
element into the language learnability debate, concerning the question of how
children can learn to use verbs, like push and pull, after hearing just a few
examples. These models flesh out the idea that it is the common substrate of the
human motor control system that drives children’s rapid and flexible acquisition
of action verbs.
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The Gavagai problem
This is not to imply that the problem of word-learning thereby becomes
trivial}there are still significant computational issues like when to conflate
representations into single, more general categories, and of course, there is the
gavagai problem (Quine, 1960). The gavagai problem, roughly, is the difficulty that
language learners in principle have in determining what in the world is referred to
by a given, novel chunk of language. Suppose a child hears push in situations in
which her mother pushes her on a swing. How is she to determine what push
denotes}is it the swing, her mother, the grass below, her feeling of temporary
weightlessness, or perhaps the action the mother is performing? In addition to
cross-situational inference (mentioned above), attention seems to be an important
component of the grounding of word meaning. Namely, human learners have the
capacity to determine with some degree of reliability what objects or locations
others are attending to. Removing this ability interferes with word learning, and
endowing it upon machine language learners facilitates word learning significantly
(Yu, Ballard, & Aslin, 2005). The utility of joint attention in language learning is just
another way that having a situated, grounded agent makes a theoretically
implausible learning problem run-of-the-mill (see also Tomasello, Carptenter, Call,
Behne, & Moll, 2004). A specific review of computational models dealing with this
issue can be found in Kaplan and Hafner (2006).
Linguistic grounding and conceptual metaphor
In many respects, Bailey’s model offers a simplistic view of what word learning
is. Learning a word is unlikely to consist only of pairing its phonology with an
embodied representation of its meaning. For instance, it implies learning to use it
(e.g. x-schema slide: place the palm
against an object and then move it
in a given direction with a given force)
(e.g. schema: slide, posture: palm,
direction: away)
labelling
feature extraction
obeying
execution
guidance
Motor actions
Linking
feature structure
Verb
senses
(e.g.  schema: slide 100%, push 0%
posture: palm 60%, index: 40%
direction: away 50%, down 30% ...
Figure 3. The model of motion verb learning described by Bailey (adapted from Bailey,
1997).
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in specific contexts and not others, with some people and not others, etc. Another
weakness of models like Bailey’s is that they usually address only rather specific
language learning problems. Some modellers now try to tackle other dimensions
of embodied language learning that occur at later stages of linguistic development.
Once language learners have a core set of basic words, and concepts to go with
them, they then move on to more complex words, grounded indirectly on the basis
of these basic words. Two important ways that new words can be grounded in
previous ones are through linguistic grounding and conceptual metaphor. In the first
case, a new word can be introduced through language}A puppy is a baby dog. A
polar bear is a white bear who lives in the snow. Knowledge of individual words and
their meanings can be used to construct new semantic representations, through
any one of a broad set of compositional mechanisms (Bergen & Feldman, 2006). In
the second case, words learned through direct associations with grounded
perceptual, motor, and other experiences can serve as the basis for abstract
language and concepts through metaphorical mappings (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980).
The concept of quantity, and the metaphorical language describing it, as in stock
prices rose or my anxiety has flattened out, has been convincingly argued to arise on
the basis of systematic correlations in early childhood experience between concrete
source domains and abstract target domains (Grady, 1997). In this particular case,
increases in height systematically (though not exceptionlessly) correlate with
increases in quantity}consider the early childhood experiences of pouring milk
into a glass or piling blocks on top of one another. Thus, abstract words and the
concepts they denote can be learned through concrete ones, which are themselves
grounded in the real-world experiences of situated, embodied agents.
Relatedness with nativist views
Figure 4 offers a schematic overview of the embodied and social cognition
approach. It could be argued that such a view is eventually not so different from
notions of semantic bootstrapping developed by Pinker and other nativists
(Pinker, 1984, 1994) if some innate language-specific knowledge is added to the
process. Indeed, the notion of biases helping language acquisition is common to
both approaches. We will come back to this similarity in the last part of this article.
DEVELOPMENTAL STANCE: A ROBOTIC EXPERIMENT
Computational learners studied in the previous stances are all passive learners:
they are exposed to a pre-specified set of data examples that were generated for
the particular task under study. This formalization of the learning process might
be misleading. During the last 10 years, the machine learning community has
begun to investigate architectures that permit incremental and active learning
(e.g. Belue, Bauer, & Ruck, 1997; Cohn, Ghahramani, & Jordan, 1996; Denzler &
Brown, 2001; Hasenjager, Ritter, & Obermayer, 1999; Mackay, 1992; Paas &
Kindermann, 1995; Plutowsky &White, 1993; Thrun & Pratt, 1998; Watkin & Rau,
1992). Active learners are machines that search and select specific training
examples. More specifically, a few researchers have started to address the
problem of designing intrinsic motivation systems to drive active learning,
inspired by research in developmental psychology and neuroscience. The idea is
that a robot controlled by such systems would be able to autonomously explore
its environment not to fulfil predefined tasks but driven by some form of intrinsic
motivation that pushes it to search for situations where learning happens
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efficiently (Barto, Singh, & Chentanez, 2004; Huang & Weng, 2002; Marshall,
Blank, & Meeden, 2004; Oudeyer & Kaplan, 2006; Schmidhuber, 1991, 2006;
Weng, 2002). Technically, such control systems can be viewed as particular types
of reinforcement learning architectures (Sutton & Barto, 1998), where rewards are
not provided externally by the experimenter but self-generated by the machine
itself. The term ‘intrinsically motivated reinforcement learning’ has been used in
this context (Barto et al., 2004).
We will discuss an experiment in which a robot exploits its own learning biases
through active learning and thus controls the complexity of its learning situations
(Oudeyer & Kaplan, 2006). In this experiment, the robot actively seeks out
sensorimotor contexts where it can learn given its morphological and cognitive
biases. Although a passive strategy would lead to very inefficient learning, an
active strategy permits the learner to discover and exploit learning situations
Structuring of
Physical experiences
Structuring of
Social experiences
Joint attention
Structuring of
linguistic experiences
1 year
linguistic grounding
conceptual metaphor
Intentional understanding
Goal-oriented actions Joint activity
2 year
Figure 4. Language acquisition is made possible through two types of biases. During their
first year, children progressively structure their physical and social experiences into
meaningful elements. Just before they utter their first words, they have developed skills
permitting goal-oriented actions, intentional understanding and joint attention. These
skills create sufficiently strong constraints to facilitate the acquisition of word meaning
and to bootstrap the development of language. During the second year, linguistic
experiences get structured and increase in complexity partly through purely linguistic
processes (linguistic grounding), partly through structuring coming from the physical or
social experiences (conceptual metaphor). This figure is available in colour online at
www.interscience.wiley.com/journal/icd
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fitted to its biases. In this experiment, a four-legged robot is placed on a playmat.
The robot can move its arms, its neck and its mouth, and can produce sound.
Various toys are placed near the robot, as well as a pre-programmed ‘adult’ robot
that can respond vocally to the other robot in certain conditions (Figure 5).
More precisely, the robot is equipped with seven continuous motor channels
that can control various actuators (movement of the head, neck, legs and
production of sounds) and with five sensory channels, corresponding to the
various sensors. The presence (or absence) of an object in the mouth of the robot,
the presence (or absence) of a visual tag within the field of view, sensor indicating
whether something is oscillating or not in the close range of the infra-red distance
sensor, mean pitch of the sound that is heard when a sound is actually perceived
by the microphone and duration of the sound that is heard. On the playmat, two
toys are present: an ‘elephant ear’ that the robot can possibly bite but that does
not produce perceivable reactions when it is bashed and a suspended soft toy
that it can bash with the arm but which is too far for biting. The pre-programmed
‘adult’ robot imitates the sounds produced by the other robot with a different
voice that shifts the pitch down. (The fact that parents help scaffolding young
infant’s learning by imitating them is well documented (Smith & Gasser, 2005).)
At the beginning of an experiment, the robot does not know anything about the
structure of its sensorimotor space (which actions cause which effects). Given the
size of the space, exhaustive exploration would take a very long time and
random exploration would be inefficient. However, this robot is equipped with
an algorithm that permits intelligent exploration based on an evaluation of what
the robot can or cannot learn at the current stage of its development.
The robot can be described as having two modules: (1) one module implements
a predictor M that learns to predict the sensorimotor consequences when a given
action is executed in a given sensorimotor context; and (2) another module is a
metapredictor metaM that learns to predict the errors that machine M makes in
its predictions: these meta-predictions are then used as the basis of a measure of the
potential interest of a given situation. Using its metaprediction system, the artificial
agent can learn how to learn by exploiting its own learning biases. The system is
designed to be progress driven. It avoids both predictable and unpredictable
situations in order to focus on the ones that are expected to maximize the decrease
in prediction error. To obtain such a behaviour, the metaprediction system computes
the local derivative of the error rate curve of M and generates an estimation of the
expected learning progress linked with a particular action in a particular context. In
order to really evaluate learning progress, error obtained in one context must be
compared with errors obtained in similar situations (if not the robot may oscillate
between hard and easy situations and evaluate these changes as progress).
Therefore, the metaprediction system must also be equipped with a self-organized
classification system capable of structuring an infinite continuous space of particular
situations into higher-level categories (or kinds) of situations. Figure 6 summarizes
the key components of such progress-driven systems (see Oudeyer & Kaplan, 2006;
Oudeyer et al., 2007 for more details).
Figure 7 represents how progress-driven learning operates on an idealized
problem. Confronted with four contexts characterized by different learning
profiles, the motivation for maximizing learning progress results in avoiding
situations that are already predictable (context 4) or too difficult to predict
(context 1), in order to focus first on the context with the fastest learning curve
(context 3) and eventually, when the latter starts to reach a ‘plateau’, to switch the
second most promising learning situation (context 2). Situations of maximal
progress are called ‘progress niches’. Progress niches are not intrinsic properties
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of the environment. They result from a relationship between a particular
environment, a particular embodiment (sensors, actuators, feature detectors and
techniques used by the prediction algorithms) and a particular time in the
developmental history of the agent. Once discovered, progress niches progres-
sively disappear as they become more predictable.
During each robotic experiment, which lasts approximately half a day, the flow
of values of the sensorimotor channels is stored, as well as a number of features
that help us to characterize the dynamics of the robot’s development. The
evolution of the relative frequency of the use of the different actuators is
measured: the head pan/tilt, the arm, the mouth and the sound speakers (used
for vocalizing), as well as the direction in which the robot is turning its head.
Figure 8 shows the data obtained during a typical run of the experiment.
It is possible to summarize the evolution of these behavioural patterns using
the concept of stages, where a stage is defined as a period of time during which
some particular behavioural patterns occur significantly more often than random
and did not occur significantly more often than random in the previous stages.
These behavioural patterns correspond to combinations of clear deviations from
the mean in the curves in Figure 8.
1. At the beginning of the experiment, the robot has a short initial phase of random
exploration and body babbling. During this stage, the robot’s behaviour is
equivalent to the one we would obtain using random action selection: we clearly
observe that in the vast majority of cases, the robot does not even look at or act
on objects; it essentially does not interact with the environment.
2. Then there is a phase during which the robot begins to focus successively on
playing with individual actuators, but without knowing the appropriate
affordances: first there is a period where it focuses on trying to bite in all
directions (and stops bashing or producing sounds), then it focuses on just
Figure 5. A four-legged robot is placed on a playmat. The robot can move its arms, its neck
and its mouth, and can produce sound. Various toys are placed near the robot, as well as a
pre-programmed ‘adult’ robot that can respond vocally to the other robot in certain
conditions. This figure is available in colour online at www.interscience.wiley.com/
journal/icd
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looking around, then it focuses on trying to bark/vocalize towards all
directions (and stops biting and bashing), then on biting, and finally on
bashing in all directions (and stops biting and vocalizing).
3. Then, the robot comes to a phase in which it discovers the precise affordances
between certain action types and certain particular objects: it is now focusing
either on trying to bite the biteable object (the elephant ear) or on trying to
bash the bashable object (the suspended toy).
4. Finally, the robot comes to a phase in which it focuses on vocalizing
towards the ‘adult’ robot and listens to the vocal imitations that it triggers.
This interest for vocal interactions was not pre-programmed, and results from
exactly the same mechanism that allowed the robot to discover the affordances
between certain physical actions and certain objects. The fact that the interest
for vocal interaction appears after the focus on biting and bashing comes from
the fact that this is an activity that is a little bit more difficult to learn for the
robot, given its sensorimotor space and this environment.
The Model in the Debate
In which sense does this experiment contribute to the debate over language
learnability? Is the present architecture intended to be a model of child
development?
Figure 6. An intrinsic motivation system including a predictor M that learns to anticipate
the consequence y of a given sensorimotor context and a metapredictor metaM learning to
predict the expected learning progress of M in the same context. The interestingness of a
given context is defined as the associated expected learning progress, and actions are
chosen in order to reach maximally interesting sensori-motor contexts. Once the actual
consequence is known, M and metaM get updated. MetaM re-evaluates the error curve
linked with this context and computes an updated measure of the learning progress (local
derivative of curve). In order to classify similar contexts, metaM includes a hierarchical
self-organizing classifier. This figure is available in colour online at www.interscience.
wiley.com/journal/icd
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Intrinsic motivation in developmental psychology and neuroscience
There is substantial evidence that children are not passive learners but are
intrinsically motivated to progress in learning. In the 1960s, psychologists like
White argued that activities enjoyable for their own sake may be accounted for by
the existence of intrinsic psychobiological human motivation (White, 1959). In the
same period, Berlyne proposed that exploration might be triggered and rewarded
for situations that include novelty, surprise, incongruity and complexity. He also
observed that the most rewarding situations were those with an intermediate
level of novelty, between already familiar and completely new situations
(Berlyne, 1960). Gibson (1988) discussed the putative role of intrinsic motivation
forces that impel infants to actively seek out new knowledge: ‘A baby is provided
with an urge to use its perceptual systems to explore the world’. Novel
investigations in neuroscience concerning neuromodulation systems have
complemented these findings. Although most experiments in this domain focus
on the involvement of particular neuromodulators like dopamine for predicting
extrinsic reward (e.g. food), some work lends credence to the idea that such
neuromodulators might also be involved in the processing of types of intrinsic
motivation associated with novelty and exploration (Dayan & Belleine, 2002;
Kakade & Dayan, 2002). In particular, some studies suggest that dopamine
responses could be interpreted as reporting ‘prediction error’ (and not only
‘reward prediction error’). At a more global level, Panksepp has compiled a set of
Figure 7. Confronted with four contexts characterized by different learning profiles, the
motivation for maximizing learning progress results in avoiding situations already
predictable (context 4) or too difficult to predict (context 1), in order to focus first on the
context with the fastest learning curve (context 3) and eventually, when the latter starts to
reach a ‘plateau’ to switch to the second most promising learning situation (context 2). This
intrinsic motivation system allows the creation of an organized exploratory strategy
necessary to engage in open-ended development. This figure is available in colour online
at www.interscience.wiley.com/journal/icd
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evidence, suggesting the existence of a SEEKING system responsible for
exploratory behaviours. ‘This harmoniously operating neuroemotional system
drives and energizes many mental complexities that humans experience as
persistent feelings of interest, curiosity, sensation seeking and, in the presence of
a sufficiently complex cortex, the search for higher meaning’ (Panksepp, 1998).
All these views support the idea that children engage themselves spontaneously
in situations characterized by some ‘appropriate’ level of novelty and that this
tendency could play a crucial role in development.
Not a model of child development
However, the experiment described above, like the other experiments we have
considered in this article, is not intended to be a model of child development. It is
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Figure 8. Results obtained after a typical run of the Playground Experiment. Top curves:
relative frequency of the use of different actuators (head pan/tilt, arm, mouth, sound
speaker). Bottom curves: frequency of looking towards each object and in particular
towards the ‘adult’ pre-programmed robot.
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a tool for thought. It permits an exploration of the mechanisms that can allow a
system to actively exploit its own learning biases in order to learn more
efficiently. This experiment shows that a form of active learning can lead to an
organized exploration characterized by successive stages. In the present case, the
notion of progress niche can help us think about the following hypothetical
developmental scenario in which ‘the discovery of communication’ takes place. If
children indeed show some form of intrinsic motivation for maximizing learning
progress, they will get successively interested in playing with and manipulating
objects or situations of increasing complexity, the choice of which is determined
by their potential returns in terms of learning progress. At a certain point in their
development, children should discover that interacting with others, for example,
by producing and listening for sounds, is an important source of learning
progress, a new progress niche. This discovery will make them more and more
interested and involved in social activities.
Interpreting developmental patterns
Developmental patterns illustrated in Figures 7 and 8 are reminiscent of many
developmental sequences observed in language development. Let us consider a
concrete example taken from the literature of children’s early vocalization. Figure
9 plots the consonant sounds infants use most often during the first 18 months.
During the first six months, labial sounds ([f]/[v]) predominate. However,
alveolar sounds ð½t%=½d%; ½s%=½z%Þ become dominant during the next three months
and continue to dominate afterwards. During the first year, velar consonants
([k]/[g]) progress gradually (but remain at an intermediary level) with an
extremum around between 9 and 12 months (Smith & Oller, 1981). How can we
interpret such a pattern? Can it be traced back to the way the child progressively
masters her vocal tract? Is it due to the evolution in stimulation that the child
experiences? Or to the new types of social interaction? Or to progresses in
perceptual capabilities? Or to anatomical changes? If we consider the child as an
active learner, a possible scenario is that children initially produce mainly
labial sounds because at the beginning they are the ones that result in the
fastest learning progress. This needs of course to be investigated further by
connecting such a developmental algorithm with a reasonably realistic model of
the vocal tract. Ideally this model should also capture the physiological changes
that happen during the child’s first year. As we have seen in the experiment,
cognitive and morphological biases play a crucial role in the organizing
sensorimotor exploration. But, in this view, these biases do not have to be
specific to language.
Active learning models are likely to permit a whole range of reinterpreta-
tions of existing developmental data (we have discussed elsewhere how
progress-driven learning provides an interpretation of developmental sequences
in early imitation (Kaplan & Oudeyer, 2007a, 2007b)). Many diverse lines of
experimental data can potentially be explained in common terms if we
consider children not as passive learners exposed to input streams but on
the contrary as active seekers of progress niches, who learn how to focus on
what is learnable in the linguistic inputs they encounter and on what can be
efficiently grasped at a given stage of their cognitive and physiological
development. We will now consider another important and largely ignored
dimension of language learnability: languages themselves may have adapted to
become learnable.
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CULTURAL EVOLUTION STANCE: A GENERATIONAL MODEL
Computational approaches to language acquisition rarely address issues related
to the evolution of linguistic forms and structures. However, it could be argued
that the two problems are integrally related, and that language learnability
cannot be understood outside of the context of language evolution. The core idea
of these models is to simulate and observe how languages adapt over time to the
learning and other usage constraints of the learners/users. There already exists a
vast number of computational models of the emergence and evolution of
language (see Cangelosi & Parisi, 2002; Kirby, 2002; Steels, 2003 for general
overviews of the field). Successful experimental and theoretical results have been
obtained in the domains of lexicon formation (e.g. Hutchins & Hazlehurst, 1995;
Kaplan, 2001, 2005; Ke, Minett, Au, & Wang, 2002; Shoham & Tennenholtz, 1997;
Smith, Kirby, & Brighton, 2003; Steels, 1996; Steels & Belpaeme, 2005),
phonological evolution (De Boer, 2001; Oudeyer, 2005b, 2005c, 2006) and
grammatical aspects of language acquisition (Steels & Beule, 2006; Steels, De
Beule, & Neubauer, 2005). Among these models, a number have studied the
impact of learning biases upon the evolution of linguistic structures, and in
particular, cultural selection for better learnability. Zuidema (2003) presented
abstract simulations of the formation of syntactic structures and observed the
influence of cognitive constraints upon the generated syntax. Brighton et al.
(2005) surveyed several simulations of the origins of syntax (Kirby, 2001) which
were re-described in the light of this paradigm of cultural selection for
learnability.
This section describes a computer experiment that illustrates cultural selection
for learnability in the field of phonology (this model is described in detail in
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Figure 9. Evolution of the consonant sounds produced between 0 and 15 months (adapted
from Smith and Oller (1981)). This figure is available in colour online at www.interscience.
wiley.com/journal/icd
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another article (Oudeyer, 2005a)). This example shows how phonological
structures can be culturally selected so as to become easily learnable. It models
the cultural formation of syllable systems, which are thought to be a fundamental
unit of the complex phonological systems of human languages (MacNeilage,
1998), and relies on the interactional framework developed by De Boer (2001)
called the ‘imitation game’. This model involves a population of artificial agents
that can produce, hear and learn syllables, based on computational models of the
auditory system and a motor apparatus that are linked by abstract neural
structures. These abstract neural structures are implemented as a set of
prototypes or templates, each being an association between a motor program
that has been tried through babbling and the corresponding acoustic trajectory.
Thus, agents store in their memory only acoustic trajectories that they have
already managed to produce themselves. The crucial property of these neural
structures is that they are not language/phonology specific. Exactly the same
learning machinery could be used to learn, for example, hand–eye coordination
or walking behaviour. This learning system has biases (for example, one of them
was that the number of prototypes that could be stored was limited), as do all
learning systems (Mitchell & Weinmann, 1997), but they are general and not
specific to language. The set of prototypes is initially empty for all agents, and
grows progressively through babbling. The babblings of each agent can be heard
by nearby agents, and this influences their own babbling. Indeed, when an agent
hears an acoustic trajectory, this activates the closest prototype in its memory and
triggers some specific motor exploration of small variation of the associated
motor program. This means that if an agent hears a syllable S that it does not
already know, two cases are possible: (1) he already knows a quite similar
syllable and has a great chance to stumble upon the motor program for S when
exploring small variations of the known syllable, and (2) he does not already
know a similar syllable and so there is little chance that he will incorporate in its
memory a prototype corresponding to S. This process means that if several
babbling agents are put together, some islands of prototypes, i.e. networks of very
similar syllables, will form in their memory and they will develop a shared skill
corresponding to the perception and production of the syllables in these
networks. Nevertheless, the space of possible syllables was large in these
experiments, and so the first thing that was studied was whether agents in the
same simulation could develop a large and shared repertoire of syllables. This
was shown to be the case (Oudeyer, 2005a). Interestingly, if one runs multiple
simulations, each population of agents will end up with their own particular
repertoire of syllables.
Then, a second experiment was run: some fresh agents were introduced to
syllable systems that were created by another population of interacting agents,
and other fresh agents were introduced to a syllable system that was generated
artificially as a list of random syllables. Performance in learning was measured as
the ability to faithfully imitate syllables. The results, illustrated in Figure 10, were
that the fresh agents were always good at learning the syllable systems
developed by other similar agents, but on the contrary rather bad at learning
the random syllable systems. In other words, the syllable systems developed
culturally by agents were adapted to their preexisting cognitive biases, and the
random systems were not. Thus, the syllable systems evolved and were selected
in a cultural Darwinian process so as to fit to the ecological niche defined by the
cognitive structures of agents, fitness here being learnability. The end result is
that evolved syllable systems have a particular structure and there is a close
match between them and the intrinsic biases of the learning system. This could
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lead an external observer to think that the learning system has innate phonology-
specific learning biases. However, this is not the case: the learning system is just a
standard sensorimotor learning system and language has evolved to fit its
preexisting biases.
The model in the debate: generational models like this one offers a alternative to
the idea that specific innate traits have been selected in order to make language
learning possible. They propose instead that languages have been culturally
selected to adapt to pre-existing non-language-specific cognitive capabilities.
Such a hypothesis would have been difficult to defend without the use of
illustrating computational experiments such as the one presented here.
TENTATIVE SYNTHESIS AROUND THE NOTION OF BIAS
Computational models of language learning have significantly structured the
debate on language learnability. Over the years, they have helped to refine our
intuitions, suggest novel lines of empirical investigation with humans, and build
concepts that shed a different light on children’s remarkable learning capacities.
Yet, have they solved the innateness controversy? The innateness question has a
long and passionate history, filled with misunderstandings (Deacon, 1997;
Marler, 2004). In the recent years a growing number of researchers have insisted
on the importance of reconsidering this debate from novel perspectives, taking
development in its full sense (Elman et al., 2001; Karmiloff-Smith, 1992; Thelen &
Smith, 1994) or articulating differently the gene–environment question (Marcus,
Figure 10. Evolution of the rate of successful imitations for a child agent that learns a
syllable system established by a population of agents (top curve), and for a child agent that
learns a syllable system established randomly by the experimenter (bottom curve). The
child agent can only perfectly learn the vocalization systems that evolved in a population
of agents. Such vocalization systems were selected for learnability (reprinted from
Oudeyer (2005a)).
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2004). Indeed, the models we have discussed in this article invite a recasting of
the innateness debate in new terms. We would like to suggest that the notion of
bias, as a cornerstone of the different approaches considered here, is a good
candidate for a synthesis.
* Language-specific learning biases: generative models insist on the necessity of
innate language specific biases to learn complex syntax.
* Generic learning biases: like any machine learning technique, connectionist
models extracting structures from sequential inputs are also characterized
by learning biases (there are things they can learn and others that they
cannot). The fact that they can learn some aspects of language means that at
least some types of linguistic structure fits their biases. However, contrary to
generative models, these biases are argued to be generic and not specific to
language.
* Physical and social biases: in addition to learning biases, embodied and social
models illustrate how language acquisition is facilitated by physical and social
biases.
* Active exploitation of biases: robotic experiments based on developmental
models illustrate how computational learners can discover and exploit their
own learning, physical and social biases in order to select and exploit what is
efficiently learnable in it its environment.
* Cultural selection based on learners’ biases: computational models of cultural
evolution investigate the hypothesis that languages themselves have evolved
to fit into the ecological niches created by the biases of their learners.
Language acquisition results from highly dynamic and deeply interacting
processes. Children’s learning biases are best understood as resulting from a
developmental history mixing embodiment factors (neural, anatomical) and
cognitive factors. In the same way, children, possibly driven by a type of innate
impulse, may actively seek out learnable situations adapted to these biases, but
languages themselves have culturally evolved to be learnable. Clearly, in such a
co-evolving process, cultural and genetic components will interact tightly. The
very idea of disentangling genetic versus cultural components becomes
unrealistic once we recognize development to be a complex dynamical process
and culture as a continuously evolving system. It is unreasonable to expect a
given learning trend or piece of linguistic knowledge to demonstrably result from
either a single bit of innate linguistic knowledge or a single relevant fact about
the input to which the child is exposed. But in order to understand the learning
and evolutionary dynamics underlying language acquisition, we need a new
scientific vocabulary; one that digs deeper than innate and learned. Computational
models, like the ones presented in this article, help refine our intuitions, suggest
novel lines of empirical investigation with humans, and build concepts that shed
a reinvigorating light on children’s fantastic learning capacities.
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